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Until relatively recently the topic of disability has been largely either explicitly ignored or implicitly neglected throughout the philosophical history of the west.  However, if and when western canonical philosophers reference physical or intellectual disability, such reference is often used to contrast a normative conception of human embodiment (i.e. rational and able-bodied) with those contingencies that mark a failure to achieve this ideal (e.g. accidents, impairments, etc.) (Byrne, 2000).  Moreover, persons with disabilities have at times been categorically defined against the traditional western philosophical subject, an agent whose embodiment entails certain intrinsically valuable rational or psychological capacities associated with what is considered normal, healthy, natural, or human (Moravcsik, 1976; Galton, 1998; Carrick, 2001; MacFarlane and Polansky, 2004).  In effect, and given the specific philosophical prioritization of human rationality, philosophically motivated conceptions of normative human embodiment by and large continue to treat reason as primary in constituting the moral worth of a particular individual in contrast to non-normative types of embodiment (Kittay, 1998, 2005; Ho, 2007).     
This essay attempts to explain this traditional and contemporary philosophical neglect of disability by arguing that the philosophical prioritization of rationality leads to a distinctly philosophical conception of disability as a negative category of non-normative embodiment.  I argue that the privilege given to rationality as distinctive of what it means to be both a human subject and a moral agent informs supposedly rational norms of human embodiment.  Non-normative types of embodiment in turn can only be understood in contradistinction to these rationalized norms of embodiment, which are predicated on the elimination of certain features and types of embodiment deemed inimical to reason.  To establish this thesis, I focus on Platonic philosophy and the Republic for three primary reasons.  First, Platonic conceptions of rationality and human embodiment have a historical and conceptual influence on contemporary assumptions concerning rational human nature and its relationship with a rationalized conception of medicine.  The ideas attributed to Socrates and Plato entail one, if not the first, attempt in the west to develop a rationalized form of medicine, up to and including rational conceptions of mental health, vice, disease, and impairment (Anton, 1980).  Second, the Republic purports to characterize an ideal, distinctly philosophical city wherein the rational norms of human embodiment are realized through programs of eugenics, euthanasia, and infanticide.  These programs attempt to produce normative bodies and eliminate non-normative bodies insofar as non-normative types of embodiment become indicators of injustice and disorder.  Finally, one influential aspect of Platonic philosophy still prevalent today in contemporary philosophical discourse is the conception of reason as an ahistorical, non-socially constructed source of ethical value and normativity that confers moral personhood and ethical value to a subject (Tooley, 1983; Singer, 1993; Kuhse and Singer, 1985;  Rachels, 1986).
 Although the programs of eugenics, euthanasia, and infanticide developed in the Republic have often been understood as merely the result of utilitarian considerations or the repetition of aristocratic Athenian medical practices, I argue that this aspect of the ideal city, the kallipolis, is a function of distinctly philosophical assumptions concerning the relationship between moral psychology, human embodiment, and the political realization of rational ideals (Popper, 1966; Levinson, 1953; Mabbott, 1971; Barrow, 1975; Creed, 1978, 349; Hamel, 1991; Heinaman, 2002).  That is, the rejection of individuals deemed morally irredeemable or physically unfit for the properly rational humans life rests upon argumentation that, in effect, informs a distinctly philosophical conception of disability insofar as certain non-normative types of human embodiment are rendered incompatible with a social configuration predicated on reason.  Despite the tendency to minimize and overlook this aspect of philosophical discourse generally and Platonic thought specifically, some notable exceptions inspect possible Platonic theories of disability without, in my view, fully analyzing the distinctly philosophical basis upon which such conceptions rest (Burkholder, 1978; Jowett, 1986; Goodey, 1992; Stainton, 2001; Becker, 2005).  
Based on this analysis of the distinctly philosophical conception of disability, I conclude that the philosophical elimination of certain non-normative types of embodiment is a function of the western conception of human rationality as applied to and realized in the human body.  The rational elimination of non-normative types of embodiment is the realization of an assumed requirement of rationality, namely that incompleteness, disorder, and wastefulness must be eliminated as a universal norm of reason.   However, if and when this rational norm is applied to human embodiment, then it follows logically that incomplete, disordered, or wasteful forms or types of embodiment must themselves be eliminated as a distinctly rational imperative. Then again, while philosophical conceptions of normative embodiment operate implicitly on the rejection of non-normative types of embodiment, this function of philosophical rationality belies the fact that human embodiment cannot be fully rationalized in any total or complete way, in part because human beings are circumscribed by the contingencies of biological processes.  Thus we must acknowledge that there is a tendency within the western conception of reason to attempt to apply rational principles to a process that is inherently beset by non- and irrational factors.  This result, in turn, should cause us to be skeptical about the philosophical assumption still shared by numerous thinkers that reason represents an ahistorical source of value that can and should be used to detail the norms of human embodiment and the quality of the properly "human" life, which occurs outside of and without reference to the social construction of rational norms of human embodiment.

2. Background
Despite the historical neglect of disability within western philosophy, an increasing interest in disability issues continues to gain momentum in philosophical discourses (Sen, 1992; Wendell, 1996; Kittay, 1998; MacIntyre, 1999; Nussbaum 2002, 2007; Ho, 2007).  Nevertheless, as I argue, such interest does not necessarily address the distinctly philosophical source of this neglect rooted in the philosophical priority given to rationality and rational norms of human embodiment.  Unless otherwise noted, I utilize the term ‘impairment’ as a descriptive term for the improper function of a physical ability or psychological capacity and ‘disability’ as the interaction between individuals with impairments and the social structures that exacerbate or minimize these impairments (Lindzey, 1998).  Although these are more or less accepted definitions in contemporary usage, and I will use these terms with these definitions unless otherwise noted, it should already clear that if non-normative embodiment is identified with irrationality, disorder, and the sub-human, then a “neutral” conception of impairment is clearly blocked.  Moreover, if certain types of non-normative embodiment must be eliminated because they are inimical to reason, then the result is a social configuration constructed so that persons with certain impairments are eliminated or cannot exist at all, perhaps the starkest of disabling social configurations.
While it is tempting to believe that the ancient Greeks shared a contemporary conception of disability by way of the ancient Greek word adunatos (incapable), the conception of disability both socially and philosophically has not remained static throughout time periods and across various cultures (Barnes, 2010; Priestly, 2001, 3-7).  As Martha Rose (2003) argues, the substitution of adunatos for ‘disability’ would not be accurate because disabled individuals in ancient Greece were not understood through reference to a clearly defined subcategory of human beings (p. 98).  That is, the conceptual distinction between categorically unimpaired individuals on the one hand and impaired individuals on the other was not a common aspect of ancient Greek culture.  Instead and owing to the hazards and particularities of ancient Greek life, there existed a spectrum of human embodiment ranging from minor to severe impairment resulting from birth or accident.  This is not to deny that many individuals in ancient Greece were rendered de facto disabled by the technological, economic, and social barriers that limited individuals with certain impairments.  However, explanatory accounts of disability were given, not through reference to a distinct medical or social category of 'disability' as such, but through reference to mythological-medical causes based upon assumptions about the proper balance of the humors (chumoi) and the cleansing (katharmos) of ritual forms of impurity (akartharsia) and spiritual pollution (miasma) (Cornford, 1975, 332; Carrick, 2001; Parker, 1983, 19-23).
Although I am in agreement with Rose that the ancient Greeks, and Plato specifically, lacked contemporary conceptions of disability, I have chosen to use the terms 'impairment' and 'disability' qualifiedly to characterize a philosophically-based conception of non-normative embodiment because this conception implicitly rests upon a categorical philosophical distinction between subsets of human beings, which is ultimately based on an application and prioritization of reason that was absent in earlier Greek culture.  The conceptualization and rationalization of disability is the result of the contradistinction between a rational-derived normative conception of embodiment and non-normative types of embodiment that fail to adhere to rational standards.  The importance of analyzing the distinctly philosophical conception of disability is that this conception operates upon the basis of distinct philosophical reasoning (logoi) and the prioritization of reason itself, rather than mythological-poetic, religious, medical, utilitarian, or sociological theories of disability as such.  However, one important consequence of the rationalization of disability is that these assumptions concerning normative human embodiment prefigure and directly inform subsequent rationalized accounts of medicine, society, religion, and the proper rational management of the bodies, both individual and political. 
 Some brief remarks on the interpretation of the Platonic dialogues are necessary, given the debate concerning the sincerity and plausibility of the philosophical ideas presented therein. Many Plato scholars interpret the ideas presented within the dialogues and the character of Socrates himself as types of “mouthpieces” through which Plato's personal philosophical views are presented to the readers in what amount to proto-essays (Friedländer, 1958, 166-170; Shorey, 1980; Vlastos, 1991, 45-80; West, 2000, 100).  This interpretation is both plausible and popular in part because it is difficult to imagine what "Platonic" thought or philosophy could be if it is not assumed that at least some of the ideas presented in the dialogues are Plato's own.  Perhaps, though, this is merely a hermeneutic assumption that one must hold when attempting to take the dialogues at their word, and the mouthpiece interpretation stands in contrast to the interpretation that the ideas contained within the dialogues cannot be attributed to Plato himself.  Rather than proto-essays or doctrinal treatises rendered into dialogues, interpreters in this camp tend to argue that the dialogues represent “philosophical dramas” or experiments in thought that promote philosophical thinking by purposefully presenting mutually exclusive ideas and argumentation (Strauss, 1964; Nails, 2000, 16; West, 2000, 103).
   In response to these ongoing debates, I believe it is difficult, if not impossible, to determine which aspects of the dialogues are attributable to Plato himself and which are meant to serve a heuristic function.  Additionally, while I do believe that attempts to understand the correct order in which the dialogues were written through stylometry are important, I am less certain that definite answers to chronological questions can be found and it is even less clear what specific philosophical end these might serve (Brandwood, 2006, 94).  Nevertheless, I do believe that there is a consistent set of philosophical considerations contained in and developed throughout the dialogues concerning the relationship between reason and normative embodiment.  Moreover, if the seventh letter attributed to Plato is genuine, then it is clear that he intended his works to convey metaphysical truths, though not in the form of an explicit scientific treatise such those found in the extant works of Aristotle (Seventh Letter 342a-232c)  However, even if one rejects the legitimacy of the seventh letter, from a philosophical perspective it may not matter what the historical Plato actually believed, in part because the philosophical positions in the dialogues can, at least in theory, be rendered philosophically plausible independent of the historical Plato.  Additionally, whether or not Plato himself agreed with a particular piece of philosophical reasoning, the dialogues and the ideas contained within them now constitute part of the western philosophical canon and their influence on contemporary philosophical discourse still exists despite questions of attributability.  
I have chosen to focus specifically on the Republic for several reasons.  First, the Republic is considered by many interpreters to be the most explicit articulation of Platonic thought and it may even represent Plato's attempt to solve the philosophical problems outlined in the early "Socratic" dialogues (Shorey, 1971; Mackenzie, 1981, 168; Irwin, 1995).  Second, as noted in the introduction, the Republic purports to characterize an ideal, distinctly philosophical city wherein the rational norms of human embodiment are realized through programs of eugenics, euthanasia, and infanticide in the attempt to produce normative bodies and eliminate non-normative bodies.  Third, and as a correlate of the second reason, the Republic entails the attempt to use reason to determine the proper hierarchy of reality and manipulate human embodiment to align with a metaphysical order that determines the ontological, ethical, and political status of a particular being in question (Kosman, 2007).  I utilize Shorey's (1964) translation of the Republic unless otherwise indicated.  Generally stated, I interpret the Republic to be in large part a critique of Athenian and Homeric cultures, and more importantly, an attempt to provide a rationalized conception of human nature, both individually and collectively.  The social critique of Athenian culture and the rationalization of human nature are motivating reasons in the Republic, and thus I believe the kallipolis is meant to be a realizable ideal at least in some sense rather than merely a naïve wish, even if such a city has not yet been realized (Republic 450d, 472c-e).
 It is worth noting here that the motivation behind creating an ideal philosophical city in speech and the nature of its specific programs have generated numerous disparate interpretations.  For example, Popper (1966) famously interpreted Plato as an authoritarian thinker whose ideal city in the Republic shares stark similarities with totalitarian dictatorships (p 19).  Popper argues that the kallipolis is meant to be an actual ideal that should be realized, up to and including its programs of “racialist” selective breeding, euthanasia, infanticide, and censorship of the free expression.  In response to Popper's critiques, Levinson (1953) defends Plato against these charges by arguing that although the ideal of the kallipolis is meant to be taken seriously, many of the supposed “totalitarian” and “racialist” aspects of the kallipolis are in fact rooted in common aristocratic Athenian values, rather than Plato’s aberrant authoritarianism (p. 195-196, 199, 570).  While some interpreters agree with these types of literalist interpretation and have suggested that the Republic could even represent a political textbook for statesmen and students, many others interpreters argue that the kallipolis is primarily meant to serve a heuristic or moral function (Boyd, 1962).  These scholars argue that reference to the ideal city serves an analogical function whereby the structural order of the individual soul shares an analogy with the structural order of the ideal city predicated on the harmonization of otherwise dissipate parts (Mackenzie, 1981; Grube, 1992, xv-xviii; Jenks, 2008, 66-68; Cady, 1983).  Thus specific aspects of the ideal city, such as the stratification of the kallipolis into separate classes, are meant primarily to be analogies through which the individual can emulate the proper rule of an ideal city on the individual level of the inner kallipolis.  There is also the possibility that the kallipolis and the Republic as a whole are meant to be ironic critiques of Athenian and Spartan cultures rather than  literal or analogical exercises (cf. Strauss, 1964).
This debate concerning the purpose of reference to the kallipolis in the Republic is fundamentally important.  While I am in agreement with scholars who highlight that the analogy of the soul and the city is meant to develop ideas contained within Platonic moral psychology (R. 368c-e), the specific programs of the kalloplis, in my view, share little analogy with the soul on the individual level.  Indeed, it is not clear at all what reference to eugenics, euthanasia, and infanticide actually has on the individual level.  Perhaps these programs entail that the individual must cultivate proper thoughts and eliminate malformed desires, but this very general and vague interpretation is not clearly based on the text and belies the concrete details that characterize these programs.  As for the debate between Popper and Levinson, I am inclined to side with Levinson who notes that, specifically in terms of infanticide and the refusal of medical treatment, while Athens lacked the type of program that Sparta employed, Popper is simply incorrect when he argues that Plato's proposal of infanticide and the refusal or medical treatment were somehow completely novel or in conflict with generally accepted ancient Greek beliefs (Levinson, 1953, 197).  Instead, Levinson notes that infanticide and the refusal of treatment for those individuals deemed undesirable (e.g. infants born out of wedlock) or defective (e.g. sufficiently physically or mentally impaired) were accepted, though not publically advertised, aspects of aristocratic Greek society (cf. Edelstein, 1987, 245).  Thus Plato is not guilty of introducing completely new programs of euthanasia and infanticide as Popper claims.  However, questions concerning the specific philosophical argumentation employed to justify such programs are not merely a repetition of the cultural values of aristocratic Athens.  My concern in this essay is not specifically the extent to which the characterization of the kallipolis is totalitarian or utilitarian or humanitarian.  Instead, my focus is on the distinctly philosophical reasoning upon which these programs of selective breeding, euthanasia, and infanticide rest in reference to normative conceptions of human embodiment.  

3. Moral Psychology, the Nature of Health, and the Ideal City 
A brief analysis of Platonic moral psychology in relation to the soul (psuchē) and nature (phusis) must be undertaken before turning to the specific argumentation concerning the rejection of non-normative human embodiment in the Republic.  This is necessary because the programs of the kallipolis rest upon assumptions concerning the analogy between bodily and psychical health, the teleological conception of human embodiment, and the practical realization of rational ideals through the proper rule of reason. 
a) In the early, so-called “Socratic” dialogues, the character Socrates makes a series of inquiries about the essential nature of virtue (aretē) and the intrinsic connection of various virtues to human knowledge (epistemē) and wisdom (sophia).  Examples of this early dialogue form with this ethical-epistemological motivation can be found in Euthyphro (piety), Laches (courage), Charmides (self-restraint [sophrosynē]), Euthydemus (eristics), Meno (virtue), and Ion (art).  Although these early dialogues often end with no definitive resolution, a general sketch of moral psychology is presented within these dialogues, which holds that virtue is primarily a type of knowledge and the use of reasoned argumentation (logoi) can allow a philosopher to come to know a virtue concept such as courage (andreia) essentially based upon its formal definition.  However, if knowledge is necessary and sufficient for virtue, then situations wherein an individual acts against her or his own rational self-interest, known as the problem of “weakness of will” (akrasia), seem to undermine either the belief that humans are fundamentally rational beings or the proposition that true knowledge of virtue is sufficient for a virtuous state of the soul (Meno 77e-d; Euthydemus 279; Protagoras 352b, 357d; Gorgias 468; Theatetus 176c). 
Rather than deny either of these propositions, the early dialogues develop the position that acting against rational self-interest results when the value of a particular thing is intellectually misjudged.  This conclusion results in the formation of two related propositions concerning moral psychology that constitute the basis of what scholars refer to generally as "Platonic Ethics," specifically: 1) no one fails willingly and 2) no one does wrong willingly (Mackenzie, 1981, 134-141).  Both propositions explain moral failure through reference to external factors outside of the agent’s control, but the first proposition focuses specifically on the tempting and overriding power of sensual pleasure (hedonē) and the emotions (pathē). The second proposition entails that when an individual acts against his or her own rational self-interest, then the individual must actually in some sense lack knowledge of what is truly good (i.e. as opposed to what is only apparently good).  Thus, and by correlate, the lack of knowledge is necessary and sufficient for vice (kakia).  The importance of these considerations of moral psychology are attested to by the fact that the primary characters in the dialogues (Socrates and then the Eleatic and Athenian Strangers) maintain these two propositions as a formal point throughout the middle and even later dialogues, though there is debate about whether or not Plato distances himself from the more “Socratic” moral psychology in the Republic (R. 382a, 413a, 492e; Timaeus 86b-87b; Philebus 22b, Sophist 228c; Laws 731c, 860d; Shorey, 1980; Bobonich, 2002).    
The characterization of human embodiment that arises in the early and early-middle dialogues is generally considered to be a dualistic type of intellectualism whereby the intellectual capacities of the human soul are prioritized over and above the physical body (soma) (Reynolds, 2004; Apology 30b; Phaedo 64d; Protagoras 357d).  Although the early Socratic dialogues tend to focus on ethical and epistemological questions rather than questions concerning metaphysical or ontological issues as such, this moral psychology rests upon the belief that the soul, here closely identified with the capacity for intellection, provides access to virtue, goodness, and truth.  Contrastingly, the physical body is primarily identified with the transient nature of matter within the realm of becoming as distinct from and ultimately contrary to philosophical wisdom , given that the material body itself has no rational access to knowledge, let alone the intelligible realm of ideas (Reynolds, 2004; cf. Phaedo 73b-74b; Meno 81b-82b).   Indeed, the body is even described as a type of prison of the soul rather than its natural home in the Phaedrus and Phaedo, and specifically in the Phaedo, Socrates characterizes philosophers as those "in training for dying" who remove attachment to material things like the body, which operates as a type of 'obstacle' (empodion) to philosophical truth (Phaedrus 250c; Phaedo 66b5-d3, 67e, 80e-81e).  However, and despite the apparently crude prioritization of the soul over the body in the early and early-middle dialogues, there is a significant disagreement about the role of the body in these dialogues and it would be simplistic to assert that the body in these dialogues is wholly negative or philosophically irrelevant (cf. Ostenfeld 1982, 136; Nussbaum, 2001; Griswold, 1996; Rowe, 1999; Broadie, 2004).  
 A more nuanced understanding of human embodiment is developed in the Republic, which introduces a tripartite conception of the soul divided into three interrelated though distinct parts (merē; eidos; genē): the rationally calculating (logistikon), spirited (thumos), and appetitive (epithumia) parts (R. 437b5-441b).  In so doing, the moral psychology of the Republic shifts from the prioritization of the soul over and above the mortal body to a conception of the soul as constituted by rational and non-rational aspects that cannot and should not be denied or purged entirely.  This development in the Republic is interpreted by some to be Plato’s own answer to the unsettled moral questions outlined in the early dialogues, specifically insofar as a tripartite conception of the soul can account for akrasia without necessitating the conclusion that either human beings are irrational or knowledge is not sufficient for virtue.  According to the tripartite conception of the soul, weakness of the will can be explained as instances wherein the spirited or appetitive part of the soul has overpowered the reasoning part of the soul, despite the individual’s own rational self-interest (Lorenz, 2006, 146).  Although I am in agreement that the Republic seeks to provide answers to the primary unanswered ethical questions raised by Socrates (Shorey, 1971), I believe that the important distinction to make between early conception of the soul and the one presented in the Republic is the claim that the natural and proper telos or goal of the rational part of the soul is not to purge the bodily but to organize the non-rational aspects of human existence into a harmonious totality (harmonia).  Indeed, in the Republic the tripartite conception of the soul as predicated on the natural rule of reason becomes primary in the creation and maintenance of justice (dikaiosynē), here understood as the properly-ordered rational management of different elements into a harmonious totality (R. 441e4-442d3).  This latter point becomes clear when, in book IV and following of the Republic, all of the virtues are identified with states wherein calculative reasoning (logistikon) is properly in control over and against Homeric assumptions about the prioritization of seemingly non-rational warrior-values like courage (440E, 571C, 605B).  
b) The term nature (phusis) is used throughout the dialogues to refer to both the generative principle (i.e. natura naturans) of natural processes of becoming (genesis) and the natural products of these processive activities (i.e. natura naturata) (Carone, 1998, 122).  Thus nature, in one sense, encompasses all there is, both material bodies and the principle of activity in the natural world, soul (cf. Timaeus 34b-c, 36e; Laws 892b-c, 896d-e).  Additionally, ‘nature’ is used throughout the dialogues in a more contemporary manner to mean the state, constitution, or condition of a particular thing owing to some particular cause (e.g. the nature of a particular body) (Phaedo 97a; Philebus 44b).  The conception of health (euexia; hygeia) developed in the dialogues is most likely based on antecedent Greek theories of medicine, specifically the 5th century Ionian physicians and Empedoclean and Pythagorean theories.  As Cornford (1975) notes, "the fundamental notion of nearly all Greek medicine was that health depends on the due balance or proportioned mixture of the ultimate constituents of the body" (p. 332).  Disagreement centered on what these ultimate constituents were, usually powers (dunameis) or effects of particular elements in interaction with the human body (e.g. the four humors).  Despite disagreement about specific constituents, health was generally considered to have been achieved when these constituents are brought into an equilibrium (iosnomia) such that no one principle comes to incorrectly dominate (monarxia) over and above the others (ibid.).  Diagnosis and pathology entailed the attempt to characterize the typical shape (eidos; idea) of a disease and its cause through an analysis of the symptoms that manifest themselves, and prognosis entailed the attempt to reestablish equilibrium (Voegelin, 1966, 94).
The relationship between the rule of reason and the characterization of justice as a type of rational organization represents the development and application of the analogy between the physical health of the body and the psychical health of the soul.  The dialogues preceding the Republic develop a metaphor between the health of the body and the health of the soul wherein virtue and vice become indicators of the health and disease of the soul just as particular symptoms are indicative of particular bodily diseases and disorders (Gorgias 464a-465, 479c; Cornford, 1975, 332; Anton, 1980; Moes, 2000; 25-57; Carrick, 2001, 37).  Health and disease become characterized not as contingent states of an individual's body or soul, but signs or shapes (eide) that point beyond superficial features to the underlying metaphysical causes that bring about states of bodily or psychical health relative to the teleology of human embodiment (Anton, 1980, 54; Carone, 1998, 1-14, Broadie, 2009).  That is, health and proper functioning become identified with order, beauty, and the good conditions of the soul, and contrastingly, disease (nosos, pathos) and dysfunction are associated directly with disorder, ugliness, and the bad conditions of the soul.  Thus both health and disease fall along a hierarchical scale according to which the natural and proper configuration of an individual's soul and body may be judged in a manner similar to the physicians and relative to the relationship between virtue and rationally-derived knowledge (cf. Laches 198; Euthydemus 279).  The importance of this development of the metaphor between the moral health of the soul and the physical health of the body throughout the dialogues is that it represents one, if the not first, attempt to provide a conceptualized and rationalized account of mental health and the ethical health of the soul, though it might be a step too far to claim that “mental health was Plato’s invention,” as Kenny (1979) claims (p. 229; cf. Anton, 1980).  
The metaphor between the physical health of the body and the ethical health of the soul is practically realized in the Republic. The crucial difference between the teleological conception of human nature presented in the early dialogues and the one found in the Republic is that the maintenance of health and equilibrium in the body are explicitly tied to the health that results naturally when reason is properly functioning, either in the individual soul or in the collectivity of the polis.  Socrates states this principle explicitly in book IV, “to produce health is to establish the elements in a body in the natural relation of dominating and being dominated by one another, while to cause disease is to bring it about that one rules or is ruled by the other contrary to nature” (R. 444d3-6).  Thus in the Republic not only are virtuous and viscous acts indicative of virtuous and vicious states of the soul as eide, but reason can and should be used to cultivate the proper type of human embodiment wherein reason is dominant, based upon the proposition that health itself, be it the health of an individual’s body or soul or a human collectivity like a polis, is primarily a function of the reasonability of the shape, form, or structural integrity of the thing in question.  This functional requirement of health in reasonability in turn relies upon specific rational criteria or values deemed to be necessary, though not sufficient, conditions of reasonableness relative to the essential nature of the thing in question (i.e. what is reasonable given the type of thing in question; for example, the shape or form deemed required for a reasonable type of human embodiment).  
c) These characterizations of the soul, the nature of health, and teleology of human embodiment factors into the construction of an ideal polis predicated on the philosophical rule of reason in the Republic.  Initially, Socrates speaks of an ideal city constituted by material necessity and ordered according to a principle of functional specialization such that each citizen has one, and only one, specific occupation determined by natural predisposition combined with proper education (370b1-2).  Even though Socrates' interlocutors reject the city of material necessity as a city fit for only beasts, the principle of specialization mirrors the tripartite conception of the soul in that each of the three aspects of the soul are aligned with the three social classes of the ideal city of luxury (truphōsa), namely the ruling guardians (phulakes), the helper or auxiliary guardians, and the producers (371a-374e; 414-415; Greco, 2009).  While this may appear to be a simple repetition of aristocratic ancient Greek assumptions concerning the proper role of an individual based upon considerations of station, class, or family, it is important to note that the ideal city described in the Republic is not based primarily on slavery, the unequal education of similarly proficient men and women, or even a completely fatalistic conception of birth in relation to the three classes (R. 457a-c, 415a-c; cf. Vlastos, 1971; Gadamer, 1986; Calvert, 1987, 367).  Subsequently, Socrates argues that rational principles of organization ought to dictate social policy, and reason can and should be used to manipulate the souls and bodies of the citizenry to create the type of individual and social harmony identified with justice (R. 376, 386a-c, 388e, 406a-409, 412-417).  Initially this rational manipulation takes the form of creating the proper paidea or education of the rulers of the ideal city, the guardians, but it culminates in the dictates of the philosopher-kings who purportedly have genuine political knowledge (politikē epistemē) of proper order (376d; 506e-509c; 509d-511e). 
 If justice in the form of the harmonious order that results from rational rule represents the ideal and natural end of individual and collective human nature, then to be human in an ideal and normative sense is identified with the type of embodiment that allows for the rational ability to actively harmonize that which is otherwise disparate and disordered.  Thus an ideal individual or city is most "beautiful” (kallos) insofar as it mirrors a divine rational order (theios kosmios) in form (eidos) (Voegelin, 1966, 94-98).  The focus on the reasoning part of the soul culminates in book IX wherein it becomes clear that the rational part of the soul (logistikon) is in fact the philosophical and distinctly human part of the soul that participates in divine mind (nous), in contrast to the sub-human or animal-like parts of human nature (R. 589a7–b1).  Hence the ability to use reason to rule is related to the ability to characterize a set of purportedly divine ideals or standards that function as an abstract and idealized measure (metron) against which particular instances may be judged and the appropriately behavior enacted accordingly (ibid., 120)  
Given this teleological conception of normative human embodiment based upon the proper function of reason, if sufficiently intellectually or physically impaired individuals cannot obtain justice the rationalized harmony identified with justice, then these individuals present a source of disorder and potential danger to an ideal city.  The difficulty at the outset is that impairments cannot, by definition, be understood simply as the otherwise neutral improper functioning of a capacity or faculty, and thus disability cannot be defined by the interaction between an individual with impairments and the contingent configuration of a society.  This consequence follows logically and directly from assumptions concerning normative embodiment such that individuals who lack normative capacities or abilities are equated with the sub-human, animal-like, or otherwise inhuman insofar as a non-normative types of embodiment symbolic of injustice must be purged through rational manipulation in the form of selective breeding, euthanasia, and infanticide (Sorabji, 1993; Stainton, 2001).  
	 
4. Philosophical Arguments for Eugenics, Euthanasia, and Infanticide 

	In this section I inspect the philosophical argumentation used to justify programs of eugenics, euthanasia, and infanticide in the Republic. As noted in the background section, the dialogues generally and the Republic specifically do not provide an explicit doctrine of physical or intellectual disability as such.  Nevertheless, the combination of a teleological conception of normative human embodiment predicated on the proper rule of reason leads directly to supposedly ideal, rational medical-ethical principles that necessitate the elimination of certain non-normative types of embodiment.  However, if the two principles of “Platonic Ethics” are to be preserved, then it is clear that individuals with non-normative types of embodiment are not morally culpable for their embodiment and hence are not criminals.  In response to this potential inconsistency, I argue that the rational elimination of certain types of non-normative embodiment is only rendered intelligible insofar as these types of embodiment become symbols of injustice, disorder, disease, and vice.  The individuals involved are not morally or criminally guilty of a particular transgression or even series of vicious choices necessarily.  Nevertheless, they must be eliminated to remove potential sources of injustice, disorder, disease, and vice, and for the sake of realizing rational ideals in the body, both the body of the individual and the polis.  These considerations amount to a distinctive philosophical conception of disability, not insofar as certain individuals fall within a specific subcategory of human persons, but insofar as distinctly philosophical assumptions and argumentation inform an idealized conception of the individual soul and society whereby individuals with certain non-normative types of embodiment will be allowed to die or actively killed because the impairment of reason forfeits their moral and human status. 
	I want to briefly defend this interpretation of the three programs against the potential critique that these programs are primarily the result of utilitarian considerations.  As noted in the introduction, the proposition that the ideal city is founded and operates upon a utilitarian basis is a commonly held interpretation (cf. Mabbott, 1971, 57; Creed, 1978, 349; Barrow, 1975; Mackenzie, 1981, 157; Heinaman, 2002).  Indeed, the text is rather explicit that the goal of the kallipolis is the greatest happiness (eudemonia) of all and thus individuals may suffer for the greater good of society, up to and presumably including active and passive euthanasia (R. 419-419e).  However, and despite the parity between certain aspects of the kallipolis and utilitarian considerations of equal ethical consideration of all, several important points in the text imply that the kallipolis is not primarily utilitarian.  First, reference to the kallipolis is prompted by Socrates' claim that justice is a virtue that is desirable in itself as well as for its results, rather than for purely instrumental or consequentialist reasons (357a-359b).  Justice is not simply a necessary or sufficient characteristic of right acts because justice as proper ordering is desired intrinsically in and for itself and not merely for instrumental reasons, as consequentialists argue.  Second, the ideal city of the Republic is ordered ultimately according to the Good and the good of each of the three classes, and thus happiness is to be identified with justice as a relational type of order, not merely happiness as a type of physical sensation like pleasure (430-431).  Surely some amount of pleasure would presumably result if an ideal, just city could be established, but this pleasure is merely a secondary consequence of the establishment of justice relative to the Good and the good of each class.  Finally, additional textual evidence in other dialogues lend plausibility to the belief that the Republic aligns with the critique of hedonism and irrational pleasure found in the early and late dialogues (cf. Apology 30b; Meno 88a-e; Protagoras 357d; Philebus 12d-15c, 21-23, 62-67).  
However, this is not to deny that what appear to be utilitarian calculations can be found within the Republic, but the crucial distinction lies in the underlying philosophical assumptions that necessitate these aspects of the kallipolis.  Indeed, the programs of eugenics, euthanasia, and infanticide are characterized as being in the best interest of the community and the individuals involved, based apparently on considerations of the common good and quality of life respectively.  Then again, there is an implicit valuation and prioritization of rationality that informs these programs and appeals to the common good and quality of life considerations as such.  That rationality is to be valued has a direct impact on what is considered good, virtuous, and ontologically correct, both in reference to a common good and those goods associated with a good quality of life.  Rationality is to be privileged because it is assumed that rationality is necessary for the proper ontological ordering of the soul and polis, the health of the body and soul, and the teleological fulfillment of human embodiment itself.  But the privilege given to rationality is not given its own independent justification, and it is difficult to imagine what this might look like when it is assumed that rationality is the distinctive feature of human beings and also the capacity that confers moral personhood and ethical value to a being.  I will return to this problem in the conclusion section of my analysis, but for now I focus specifically on the three programs and their philosophical justification. 
a) I first focus of the selective breeding programs of the kallipolis because the explicit goal of this program of eugenics is the creation of the ideal type of embodiment.  The proposal of the rational manipulation of reproduction and the abolition of the family unit in the kallipolis comes in one of three controversial “waves” (kumata) of proposals for the ideal city (R. 459d-e); the other two are the common education of men and women, and of course, the philosopher-kings (457a-c, 472a, 437c-d).  Although the ancient Greeks had no knowledge of modern genetics, the assumptions concerning the benefits of eugenics and selective breeding in the Republic was most likely drawn from examples taken from animal breeding in the form of husbandry (Galton, 1998, 265).  Through a selective breeding program that pairs ideal mates according to class as well as physical and psychical aptitude, the kallipolis attempts to address the contingencies and errors that result through haphazard (i.e. non-rationally-directed) reproduction and rearing of children (e.g. over/under-population, the weakening of the moral health of the soul etc.).  Individuals who pair outside of the strictures of the breeding program are subject to sanction and even the forced termination of the pregnancy; an example of this is the termination of unlawful pregnancies and any pregnancies wherein the woman is over the age of forty (R. 461a-d; cf. Theaetetus 149b-c).  
The eugenics program of the kallipolis is important for my analysis for three primary reasons.  First, it is important to note that the rational manipulation of reproduction, up to and including the termination of unlawful pregnancies, demonstrates that the concerns about non-normative embodiment are not isolated solely to individuals who might be considered impaired or disabled by today’s standards.  Indeed, numerous individuals who, by contemporary standards, would not be considered impaired or disabled at all would be subject to active euthanasia or exposure because their very existence embodies potential sources of disorder.  Second, the explicit goal of the eugenics program is to create the ideal type of human embodiment for the guardians through the rational manipulation of an otherwise non-rational process.  Just as non-rationally-directed reproduction is beset by the contingencies and errors of biological processes, human embodiment more generally is acknowledged to be in need of manipulation precisely because of the problems that result when ideal medical practices are withheld.  Third, it must be acknowledged that the eugenics program is considered even by Socrates to be "deeply contrary to belief," whereas the consideration of the euthanasia and infanticide programs are quickly accepted by the interlocutors and determined to be the reasonable, and even ideal, medical practices endorsed by the ancient Greek god of medicine and healing, Asclepius (R. 406d1; 473e).  
b) The rejection of individuals of non-normative embodiment in the form of euthanasia and infanticide occurs in book III and IV of the Republic within the discussion of ideal medical practices and their relation to the health of the soul.  While it may appear that these arguments only apply to the already scrutinizing eugenic programs applied to the guardian class, Socrates reiterates that these medical practices ought to be established by law and applied to any ideal city as a whole as an rational medical-ethical dictum (409e3).  
	However, given that the Republic is primarily concerned with ethical and political matters, extensive treatment of rational cosmology and the ontology of disease, vice, and evil are absent.  Due to this absence, a brief analysis of the consideration of these topics found in Plato’s Timaeus is required.  While elements of a rational cosmology are found throughout the dialogues, the Timaeus contains the most extensive treatment of cosmology, the embodiment of soul, and the sources of evil, disorder, disease.  Dramatically, the Timaeus is a set as a sequel dialogue to the Republic, and this, combined with the parity between conceptions of human embodiment in both dialogues, lends plausibility to the interpretation that the Timaeus either expresses or develops the natural philosophy implicit in the Republic (Timaeus 17c-19a).  Timaeus, who takes the role from Socrates as the principle speaker of the dialogue, provides an account of the natural world that explains that its beautiful order (kosmos) is the result of an artisan-like Demiurge who fashions the material world rationally according to the forms (29a).  The Demiurge creates an ordered cosmic hierarchy in which the lesser gods, human beings, animals, plants, and inanimate material objects all have a proper, descending place in a great chain of being like rungs on a ladder.  This hierarchy also relates the superiority or inferiority of each class of thing such that animals, plants, and inanimate objects are inherently inferior to normatively embodied human souls because these things lack the ability to exercise of reason and thereby participate in divine mind (nous) (T. 42c; Carone, 1998, 122).
Given that the Demiurge is described as a benevolent producer of cosmic order and the world-soul, the sources of evil, disorder, and disease require an explicit explanatory account, if not a type of explicit theodicy.  The source of general imperfection and evil in the Timaeus is identified with the limited nature of physical matter and the corporeal body, rather than some inherent defect in soul or the Demiurge (cf. Phaedo 80d-81d; Hoffleit, 1937; Vlastos, 1939/65; Robinson, 1970).  By its very nature, matter is transient and subject to change, contingency, and corruption, whereas the immortal (i.e. rational) part of the human soul in particular is identified with the eternal, necessary, and divine aspects of reality.  This accounts for a type of "negative evil" that exists because reality is an imperfect reflection or image of the eternal realm of ideas (cf. Theatetus 176a; Philebus 26b, 25e-26b; Cherniss, 1971, 246). However, it is also important to note that there are arguments and references in other dialogues that lend credence to the interpretation that matter and the body are either not wholly responsible for the existence of evil and that soul itself may be cause of evil insofar as it proceeds matter (cf. Phaedrus 245c-246a; Laws 895a; Cornford, 1975; Skemp 1967, 74-78; Taran, 1971).  
After outlining a general account of negative evil, Timaeus outlines two primary kinds or types of "positive" evil and how these manifest in the form of disease and disorder.  The two kinds of “positive” evil are 1) disorderly motion, and 2) evil that besieges and infects the soul (T. 30a; 43a-44c; 53b; Nightingale, 1996, 65-68).  The lesser, created gods are tasked with incarnating immortal human souls in the mortal bodies, which combines with the immortal part of the soul with the “mortal" parts of the soul, the spirited and appetitive parts (T. 69a6-92c9).  The person becomes a rational (emphrona) being if the rational soul is not impeded by the state of the body and the contingencies of biological development, upbringing, and education.  The origin of bodily disease is explained through the replacement of ordered motion with disordered motion that disrupts the harmony of the four primary elements and causes the unnatural reversal of normal biological processes (e.g. decomposed flesh and discharges enter into the veins) (81e-82; cf. Cornford, 1975, 337).  Disease in the soul is traced to a poor disposition of the body as a result of defective bodily constitution, upbringing, or accident (T. 86b-87b).  In line with the two principles of "Platonic Ethics," disease in the soul is not voluntarily chosen, and the power of the body over the soul can determine the actual and potential health of the soul.  Specifically, the disorder of the soul "folly" or "imbecility" (anoia) refers to any state in which the human being does not participate in divine reason (nous) and is thus unable to utilize reason to correctly order the soul (Cornford, 1975, 346).  Timaeus then distinguishes two types of folly, madness (mania), here understood as a state of uncontrollable passion, and "stupidity" (amathia), as lack of both the capability and desire for understanding (ibid.).  
 Returning to the Republic, passive euthanasia in the form of the refusal of medical treatment is defended as an ideal medical practice that solves the problem posed by individuals who are chronically physically impaired by birth, accident, or old age (R. 405a-408).  Although within the broader context of ancient Greece euthanasia in the form of the refusal of medical treatment was a common practice, the program of euthanasia rests upon a distinctly philosophical basis (Edelstein, 1987, 245).  The explicit justification of this program of euthanasia is based upon the rational principle of functional specialization such that each citizen must perform one, and only one, occupation based upon natural predispositions toward particular arts (technai) (R. 370b1-2).  According to this line of argumentation, if a citizen of the kallipolis cannot fulfill her or his societal function due inability, pain, or impairment that requires extensive medical treatment, then these individuals ought to be denied medical treatment and accordingly allowed to die (406d-e).  Socrates offers the additional justification that chronic illness and physical impairment reduce the quality of life necessary for a dignified human life, and a sub-human life is simply not worth living at all (406b3-c; cf. Apology 38a; Crito 48b).  While quality of life considerations in general are both necessary and justified when asking bioethical questions, as presented in the Republic, the quality of an individual life is predicated ultimately on the proper function of reason and not necessarily concerns about the actual pleasure, pain, or even happiness a proposed life may entail (R. 406b3-c).  That is, given the relationship between the health of the body and the health of the soul, the embodiment of invalids and individuals with chronic physical impairments block the attainment of the good and healthy life associated with a reasonable life, even if the physical impairment does not negatively impact the rational part of the soul in particular.  This latter point follows from the belief that chronic physical impairment or deterioration of the physical body represents an undesirable and even unreasonable form of life insofar as the ability of reason to completely rule the body and its functions has been impaired.
In addition to a program of euthanasia, a program of active euthanasia and infanticide through exposure and active killing is proposed to rid the city of individuals “of defective birth” (kakophueis) and those who are ethically “incurable” (aniatous), rather than "wellborn" (euphueis) (410a).   The explicit justification for the active killing of these individuals rests on the proposition that some individuals lack the rational soul's distinctive capacity to respond to moral education, presumably from birth but perhaps through accident as well (409e-410a; 410a1-3).  This conclusion is based upon the requirements of rational moral judgment and the psychical capacities required to acquire abstract, conceptual knowledge (epistemē) concerning virtue (aretē) and its application to particular cases outlined in section three.  To characterize the relationship between judgment and moral virtue, Socrates refers analogically to an ideal doctor as an individual who should be acquainted with illnesses, but if the doctor is consumed by disease completely, then any consequent judgment in the form of a diagnosis will be corrupted as well (408d-e).  Similarly, the ability to obtain order the elements of the soul predicated on the rule of reason requires the ability to make moral judgments between good and evil in others without being consumed wholly by evil itself (409b3-c).   However, to be immune from being consumed entirely by evil, an individual requires a properly functioning, rather than an impaired, rational part of the soul.  Thus supposedly some individuals lack the capacities entailed by the rational soul by birth and they will be hopelessly unresponsive to moral education at best and a potential source of disorder and crime in the polis at worst (410a).   That is, in some individuals, by birth, accident, or repeated acts of vice, reason itself in the form of the rational soul can be impaired.  
	  The various translations of kakophueis and aniatous in this section of the Republic attest to the difficultly of translating ancient Greek words for contemporary readers.  Kakophueis is generally translated as some variation of poor or unsound bodily constitution resulting from birth, though Jowett (1986) translates this term as “diseased in their bodies” specifically (Waterfield, 1993; Cornford, 1964; Jowett, 1986).  Aniatous enjoys much more variation in translation.  Most translations retain reference to incurability with some (e.g. Cornford and Waterfield) focusing on the corruption of the “mind” specifically, while others (e.g. Jowett) place emphasis on corruption in the soul (Cornford, 1964, 100; Waterfield, 1993, 111; Jowett, 1986, 160).  The difficulty of course is walking a fine line between vagueness, such as Bloom (1991) who translates both kakophueis and aniatous to mean those who lack good nature in body and soul, and anarchonism, such as Grube (1992) who translates aniatous to mean “incurable psychopaths” which explicitly invokes contemporary assumptions about psychopathy (Bloom, 1991, 88; Grube, 1992, 60).  
Clearly there is discrepancy between these translations.  Some interpreters translate these terms in more neutral, descriptive ways much closer to a contemporary conception of impairment, whereas others translate these terms to clearly highlight the evaluative and ethical dimension of these terms.  I have retained Shorey's (1964) translation because I believe it is the most accurate, both to the Greek itself, and to the philosophical motivation behind the usage of such terms.  Kakophueis clearly makes reference to the bad or poor (kako) constitution of an individual as a result of the production (phueis) of the body.  Given this meaning, kakophueis appears to be a descriptive term like 'impairment.'  Aniatous here most likely means unresponsive to moral education, despite how and when such a state was achieved in the course of life, though this seems to necessitate that neonates cannot be incurable in this fashion and there are even doubts about adult humans as well (cf. Brickhouse and Smith, 2002, 33). Only if the reincarnation myths provided at the end of the Republic and throughout the dialogues are interpreted literally could the embodiment that an individual soul receives be in any way a result of moral choice, but even this explanation is rendered less plausible, given that non-normative incarnations resulting from choice should still be considered the result of a type of ignorance or error (cf. Phaedo 107-108; Gorgias 524-527e; Republic 614b-621d; Timaeus 42c-d, 69a6-92c9; Statesman 269c-274e).  However and despite these two plausible definitions, I believe it is the case that kakophueis and aniatous cannot be neutral descriptive statements akin to the term 'impairment' because the impairment of rational embodiment (e.g. the body and soul) due to birth, upbringing, or habituated acts of vice has intrinsic normative implications.  Then again, I also believe that the discrepancies between the translations and the different ways in which the terms are employed indicates the real ambiguity that exists in this section of the Republic such that it is not clear which individuals and what specific types of non-normative embodiment are subject to elimination.  
	 The question concerning whom the programs of selective breeding, euthanasia, and infanticide are meant to apply to is really a question concerning the requirements for moral status in the Republic, what today might be called moral personhood, and what principles, causes, or states confer this moral status to a particular being (Warren, 1997, 60-65).  Based on my analysis in section three and four, it should be abundantly clear that mere physiological life is not a sufficient condition for ethical value.  Again, it is the good human life and not any life as mere organismal subsistence that is valued.  Additionally, it should not be surprising that the dialogues generally and the Republic in particular do not provide a conception of the inherent dignity of human persons such found in the Judeo-Christian-Islamic tradition, nor what today are called human rights, precisely because being biologically alive and having some kind of soul is not enough for moral status and intrinsic rights (cf. Crosby, 2001, 303-304).  Instead, moral status results when the rational part of the soul is actualizing a body with a reasonable constitution combined with the capacity of the rational soul to obtain individual justice.  That is, reason and its intrinsic relationship to a normative conception of human embodiment results in moral status. The ability to reason is taken to be definitive and intrinsically valuable both in itself and instrumentally through the telos of justice as proper rule.  Thus the answer to the question of the scope of the application of these three programs then is, in one sense, clear-cut, and in another, hopelessly vague.  Clearly any individual who lacks the type of embodiment identified with the bodily constitution and rational capacity associated with the norms of human embodiment are subject to the demands of the programs of active and passive euthanasia.  Then again, if one asks which specific disorders, syndromes or diseases will necessarily disqualify an individual from the kallipolis, the answer is much less clear, in part owing to the chasm between contemporary classifications of pathology and ancient Greek conceptions of these disorders, syndromes, and diseases.
The purpose of the analysis in this section was to highlight the distinctly philosophical argumentation and assumptions used to justify programs rationally designed to create an ideal type of embodiment and eliminate non-normative types of embodiment.  The philosophical emphasis on rationality in particular demonstrates that these programs are not enacted merely for utilitarian or humanitarian reasons as such.  As noted, the individuals with non-normative embodiment are not clearly criminals in any normal sense of the word.  They are not subject to elimination because of some series of moral choices, but because their embodiment symbolic of irrationality, disorder, disease, and vice.  The attempt to provide a rationalized conceptualization of health in relation to virtue, both in the body and in the soul, leads directly to the conclusion that certain types of embodiment are inimical to the ideal requirements of embodiment and political order.  That is, certain types of non-normative embodiment disfigure the shape (eidos) of an individual or city insofar as their very existence entails the existence of the unmeasured, disordered, and diseased.  The existence of non-normative types of embodiment indicate that a particular city is unhealthy, but they are also symbolic of the imperfect, contingent, and transient nature of the material dimension of reality itself.  This is the distinctly philosophical conception of disability insofar as the prioritization of reason itself results in a negative category of disability as a type of non-normative embodiment.  The key is that this type of disability is understood primarily through reference to reason and the impairments themselves are ultimately identified with the impairment of reason, either the reasonable control over the physical body or the impairment of the rational soul itself.

5. Conclusion - Reason and Normative Embodiment
	In this concluding section I briefly focus on some of the main conclusions that result from my analysis of the philosophical conception of disability.  I begin with a focus on Platonic philosophy and the relationship between reason and normative embodiment before turning to the contemporary importance of my analysis.
It is important to note that the later dialogues may contain a critique of the social and political programs of the kallipolis presented in the Republic.  While the Republic places emphasis on an ideal city ruled by the dictates of philosopher-kings, in the ideal city presented in the dialogue Laws, Magnesia, the individual rulers are replaced by the sovereignty of laws (cf. Laws 692a-692e, 721a-753e, 715d; Rueve, 1935; Morrow, 1941, 304).  Magnesia is perhaps designed by philosophers, but its organization and programs are more concerned with the majority of its citizens.  Thus less stringent programs of reproduction and health are presented in Laws, and the less stringent nature of Magnesia is interpreted by some thinkers to be a critique of the kallipolis of the Republic.  This interpretation has some plausibility, especially if the Laws was written late in Plato's life.  However, the Laws does not invalidate or completely replace the assumptions in the Republic concerning the relationship between reason and normative embodiment, and if anything, the specific form such reasoning takes merely differs according to the particularities of the context of dialogues.  
	 The distinctly philosophical conception of disability results from the rational conceptualization of health and the application of rational principles to human embodiment.  In antecedent ancient Greek medicine, disorder and disease had been explained through reference to either materialistic causes (e.g. the disorder of the humors) or mythological-religious causes (e.g. divine punishment, the presence of an evil spirit, etc.).  But Platonic philosophy and the Republic develop a rationalized conception of disorder, the ontology of disease, and the relationship between bodily health and the virtuous state of the soul.  In effect, explanations rooted in non-rational causes are replaced by accounts derived through argumentation, argumentation which intrinsically prioritizes reason itself.  Disorder, disease, and their relatedness to non-normative embodiment gain a new, rational referent within a philosophically-based framework for understanding human embodiment.  That is, disorder, disease, and non-normative types of embodiment are rendered intelligible within a philosophical system through reference to an idealized conception of reason and its ability to be applied to human embodiment.  There is even a sense in which the elimination of non-normative types of embodiment is a rationalized from of the purification of ritual pollution (miasma), the difference being that the impairment of reason represents a distinctly rational type of pollution that must be cleansed.  
	Within an conceptual framework that prioritizes reference to rational explanations, non-normative types of embodiment are rendered intelligible as that which is contrary to reason and reasonability.  While mythological-religious accounts could perhaps properly blame an individual for her or his embodiment, a rationalized conception of non-normative embodiment requires reference to idealized rational standards against which embodiment may be understood.  Thus individuals who are unable to exercise full rational control over their bodily functions or those who are unable to participate in the type rational thought identified with the properly human life are seen as aberrant.  The metaphor between bodily health and the health of the soul cannot simply remain a metaphor, and while individuals with non-normative embodiment are not morally culpable, their embodiment becomes the primary factor in their ethical, political, and even metaphysical status.  That is, the prioritization of reason entails that the capacity of reason itself is sufficient for human nature and moral personhood with the result that the actual human person involved becomes understood only in reference to abstract rational considerations.  The standards and norms of reason become the standards and norms of human embodiment rationally conceived, and in effect the body itself becomes a site for the somatic realization of rational principles.  The rational aversion to disorder, incompleteness, incongruity, and waste, which represent rational requirements or norms of rational thought, are thus applied to human embodiment.  The end result is that the types of non-normative bodies believed to be disordered, incomplete, incongruous, and wasteful are subject to the universal standard of reason that necessitates the elimination of such elements as a distinctly rational imperative. 
	Although a full explication of the contemporary importance of my analysis of the philosophical conception of disability lie outside the scope of this essay, the most immediate result of this analysis is the focus placed on developments in the intellectual history of the west that prefigure and influence Aristotelian and modern conceptions of medicine, health, and human embodiment (cf. Aristotle's Politics 1135b20-25; Kuhse & Singer, 1985, 111).  While I am in agreement with Davis (2012) and those thinkers who focus on 19th century medical and statistical theories to analysis the history of disability and "normalcy," these theories also purported to be rational.  Rationalized medical theories in turn rest implicitly on assumed norms of human embodiment and these differ from the specific content of any one of the specialized disciplines, such as medicine or sociology.  For the most part, the assumed rational norms of human embodiment are implicit in many of everyday judgments about human embodiment and the relationship between reason and the quality of life.  Even in specialized discourses many philosophers still conceive of reason as an ahistorical, non-socially constructed source of normativity that confers moral personhood and ethical value to a subject (cf. Tooley, 1983; Singer,1993; Kuhse and Singer,1985;  Rachels, 1986).  The prioritization of reason and its distinctive role in the formation of the ideal type of embodiment is by and large implicitly assumed in these accounts and an independent justification of the privilege given to reason is often absent.  This is no surprise because rational standards appear to be ahistorical and universal, and the result of applying these standards to human embodiment is presumed to the creation of a set of norms embodiment that can apply to all (human) beings at all times without exception.  But the appearance of ahistoricality and universality cannot be reconciled with the particularities of the historical development of western conceptions of rationality.  The standards of what constitute the healthy human body and the ideal human life are not as static as the rules of logic or the norms of rational argumentation.  Quality of life considerations and the rational norms of embodiment vary vastly according to the configuration of a society and the way in which concepts are formed, employed, and altered historically.     
	The analysis of the philosophical conception of disability should cause us to be skeptical about the very possibility of conceiving of a rationalized type of human embodiment and applying rational principles to human bodies.  This is not to deny that some type of empirical standards are necessary concerning embodiment, especially given the practical demands of embodied human life.  But empirical standards, however, stand in stark contrast to idealized standards that are not necessarily based upon statistical or scientific analysis as such.  Then again, even with potential empirical accounts, the standards employed presuppose certain epistemic or rational standards that apply to both empirical and ideal accounts.  These considerations reveal the inherent impossibility of a complete rationalization and conceptualization of human embodiment.  Indeed, human bodies result from biological processes inherently subject to contingency, error, and randomness.  This is an ontological fact about what it means to be human and to have a human body.  Rational principles are abstract generally, and if rooted in some form of necessity, admit of no exceptions.  Human embodiment on the other hand is concrete, particular, and in one sense, each case is an exceptional instance.  Thus human embodiment strains the confines of any closed rational system that purports to identify the necessary or sufficient conditions for normative types of embodiment, and by correlate, the rationally ideal or good life.  The attempt to apply rational principles to human embodiment is an inherent possibility within the western conception of reason itself.  However such rational accounts are simply not achievable, not because of some defect within reason or human embodiment as such, but because reason is simply not the type of thing that can carve nature at the joint of human embodiment.
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